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Identity, Form, or Place of
Organization
Stephen L. Kadish
THE FIFTH and sixth types of reorganizations, found under
subsections (E) and (F) of section 368(a)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 are quite different from those found in the
first four subsections. The two principal differences are that "E"
and "F" reorganizations in-
volve only a single corporation
THE AUTHOR: STEPHEN L. KADISH and, unlike "B," "C," and "D"
(B.A., Williams College; LL.B., Colum- reorganizations, there are no
bia University; LL.M. in Taxation,
Georgetown University) is a practicing complex statutory requirements
attorney in Cleveland, Ohio, a former which must be met. The Code
attorney-advisor to Judge Train of the
United States Tax Court, and a member has simply provided since 1921
of the New York and Ohio Bars. that an "E" reorganization is
"a recapitalization" and that an
"F" reorganization is a "mere
change in identity, form or place of organization however effected."
The beguiling simplicity of these categories has required and re-
ceived many years of judicial interpretation.
I. TYPE "" RECAPITALIZATIONS
Because the Internal Revenue Code nowhere defines the term
"recapitalization," one must resort to the regulations and case law
for guidance. While the Supreme Court has merely referred to a
recapitalization as the "reshuffling of a capital structure within the
framework of an existing corporation,"' the Third Circuit has de-
fined recapitalization in more detail as "an arrangement whereby
[thel stock [and] bonds . .. of the corporation are [reladjusted as
to amount, income or priority, or an agreement of all stockholders
and creditors to change and increase or decrease [the] capitalization
I Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942).
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or debts of [the] corporation or both .... "'
The regulations,' rather than attempting a definition, give five
examples of situations which constitute recapitalizations. The first
situation involves bondholders who exchange their bonds for pre-
ferred stock; the second4 and fourth examples involve the issuance
of common stock in exchange for outstanding preferred stock; the
third' example concerns the issuance of preferred stock in exchange
for outstanding common; and the final example involves the issu-
ance of new preferred stock in exchange for outstanding preferred
on which dividends are in arrears.
It should be noted that these exchanges affect only the relation-
ships between the corporation and its shareholders, because a re-
capitalization involves only a single corporation which receives no
property itself but merely rearranges its obligations to its share-
holders.' In fact, a recapitalization can occur simply by a change
in the corporate charter, without any exchange of stock or secur-
ities.'
A. The Objectives of Recapitalization
Before examining the various types of recapitalizations, it will
be helpful first to consider some of the purposes for which recapi-
talization is utilized. For example, a corporation with one class of
outstanding common stock can by recapitalization create two classes
of common stock, one of which is nonvoting, in order to provide
the voting shareholders sufficient control to fix management poli-
cies and at the same time not distort the equity participation or
other rights of the nonvoting shareholders. Alternatively, the cor-
poration might create a class of preferred stock to give fixed income
to one set of shareholders while giving the benefit of the equity
growth to other shareholders who are more active in the manage-
ment of the business. The creation of preferred shares may help
to fix the estate taxes on such shares and thus enable the holders
to make gifts or otherwise aid them in estate planning. The crea-
tion of a class of preferred stock to supplement a corporation's sin-
2 United Gas Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1944).
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(e) (1955).
4 The second example is based on case law, e.g., Kistler v. Burner, 58 F.2d 687 (D.C.
Cir. 1932).
5 The third example is based on such cases as H.E. Muchnic, 29 B.T.A. 163 (1933),
acquiesced in, XIII-1 Cu.NM. BULL. 11 (1934).
6 Truman H. Newberry, 14 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 643 (1945).
7 Rev. Rul. 56-654, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 216.
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gle class of common stock can also assist less affluent shareholders
and employees to purchase a common equity interest in the cor-
poration.'
A recapitalization may also be used by a corporation to simplify
its complex capital structure. A corporation with several classes of
stock outstanding may wish to convert these stocks to a single class
in order to elect Subchapter S. Alternatively, a corporation may
improve its credit rating by issuing additional shares of common
stock in exchange for outstanding debentures or preferred stock,
especially where the preferred stock dividends are in arrears. A
recapitalization may also be used to facilitate corporate acquisitions
by enabling either the acquiring or the acquired corporation to
modify its capital structure.
B. Types of Recapitalizations
A recapitalization by means of an exchange of stock for out-
standing bonds, which might be done in order to reduce the debt
obligations of the corporation thereby improving its credit rat-
ing, is almost always acceptable to the Internal Revenue Service;
the possibility of the exchange being viewed as a "bailout" of
corporate earnings is low because the bondholders assume a po-
sition of lower priority in the corporate capital structure. The
converse, an upgrading of priority, is not usually favored as will be
indicated below. Because a bondholders' claim for accrued interest
is not considered severable from the underlying debt, exchanges of
stock for outstanding bonds, including exchanges stated to be for
unpaid interest,9 may be undertaken even when interest is in arrears
on the bonds.'" These exchanges will be tax free even if the stock
received is worth less than the principal amount of the securities
surrendered." Similarly, the exchange of preferred stock which
8 For example, assume that a corporation had a net worth of $1,000,000 and that
a young group of executives wished to purchase a 50 percent equity interest because they
desired a large voice in management and a substantial participation in the growth of the
corporation. In order to achieve their objectives they would ordinarily have to raise
$500,000. By recapitalizing the company so that $600,000 of preferred stock is issued
to the existing shareholders in exchange for 60 percent of their common stock, the equity
interest of the remaining common stock would be $400,000, and purchase of a 50 per-
cent interest would require a purchase price of only $200,000.
9 See Estate of William Bernstein, 21 T.C. 100 (1952), acquiesced in, 1955-1 CUM.
BULL. 3.
10 See Commissioner v. Carman, 189 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1951), acquiesced in,
1959-1 CuM. BULL. 76; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-2(c) (2), (4) (1955).
11 Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 80. See also Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2
CuM. BULL. 143. One word of caution should be mentioned - the Government still
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has arrearages for new common or preferred will qualify as a re-
capitalization, but if it is done solely for the purpose of discharging
arrearages it will constitute a taxable distribution under section
305 (b) (1).12
The surrender of bonds in exchange for bonds is generally tax
free, but the fair market value of any excess principal amount con-
stitutes "boot" under sections 354(a) (2) (A) and 356(d)(2)(B).13
This "boot" will be taxable as capital gain if it does not have "the
effect of the distribution of a dividend" under section 356(a)(2).
The Government, however, can usually be expected to contend
that there has been an "automatic dividend" under the rule of Com-
missioner v. Bedford's Estate.'4 It should be noted that the exist-
ence of "boot" will not necessarily jeopardize the nonrecognition
treatment of the recapitalization. This is also true where, incident
to a recapitalization, a small amount of cash is paid either as a pre-
mium or as a substitute for prior undeclared dividends. Even
though the recipients are taxed on the cash received, the transaction
may still constitute a tax-free recapitalization. 5
The exchange of stock for stock of a different class will usually
constitute a tax-free recapitalization."6 In addition, the exchange
of common for common, or preferred for preferred, may qualify for
nonrecognition treatment under section 1036, without any neces-
sity for compliance with the reorganization provisions.'
In a recapitalization common stock is often exchanged for both
has outstanding a nonacquiescence in the case of Commissioner v. Capento Sec. Corp.,
140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944), and might contend that the corporation received can-
cellation-of-indebtedness income under section 61 (a) (12) of the Code.
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (e) (5) (1955).
S3 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.356-3(b) (4), (6) (1955).
14325 US. 283 (1945). But ef. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d
Cir. 1956); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
15 See, e.g., Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1941);
Humphryes Mfg. Co., 45 B.T.A. 114 (1941); J. Weingarten, Inc., 44 B.T.A. 798
(1941), acquiesced in, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 19.
16 For example, an exchange of stock for stock may be useful where two family
groups of shareholders wish to preserve their respective degrees of voting control. A
single class of outstanding common stock could be exchanged for two newly created
classes of common stock each with definite dividend and voting rights and each class
restricted so that it may not be transferred outside of the family group to which it was
issued. The majority shareholder group could then use a voting trust in order to assure
continuity of control.
17 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1036-1 (a) (1956). Qualifying for nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 1036 may become important, for example, when there is an attempt
to obtain clearance under section 367 for transactions involving foreign corporations.
Rev. Rul. 64-156, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 139, provides that section 1036 overrides section
368 for purposes of a section 367 ruling, and Rev. Rul. 66-171, 1966-1 Cum. BULL.
181, reaches the same result for an "F' reorganization.
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common and preferred stock, and although such an exchange is
generally tax free, the preferred stock may constitute section 306
"hot" stock, thereby causing recognition of ordinary income upon
disposition. 8 Generally, such a transaction is tested for section
306 consequences by ascertaining what the "effect" would have
been if cash had been distributed instead of the preferred stock."
It should be noted that there can be no section 306 stock if the
corporation had no earnings and profits at the time of recapitaliza-
tion.2" The use of a "callable" common stock in a recapitalization
may also result in a section 306 "taint."'
An exchange of stock for bonds is the most controversial and
complex area of recapitalizations. This type of exchange is closely
scrutinized by the Government, for not only can a corporation de-
duct the interest payments on the bonds (in contrast to the non-
deductibility of dividends), but the exchange may be a prelude to a
bailout of earnings and profits at capital gains rates through the
sale of the bonds or their retirement under section 1232(a)(1).22
The landmark case in the area, Bazley v. Commissioner,3 decided
by the Supreme Court under the 1939 Code, provided at best a set
of ambiguous criteria for disqualification of exchanges of bonds for
stock. In Bazley a family-controlled corporation with a large
amount of earnings issued stock and bonds in exchange for out-
standing stock. The distribution was pro rata, and the bonds were
callable at any time. The Court found a lack of business purpose
for the transaction. Small wonder that the transaction was held
not to be a tax-free recapitalization. By contrast, in several cases
since Bazley, after determining the existence of valid business rea-
sons, lack of control and marketability, and nonpro rata distribu-
tions, lower courts have permitted the tax-free issuance of bonds in
recapitalizations.24 Thus it appears that there are instances in which
18 See generally Lowy, When Does Section 306 Taint Preferred Stock Received in
Reorganizations - A Latter Day Concept of Bailout, 28 TAX LAWYER 191 (1967)
(formerly ABA TAXATION SECTION).
19 See CODE § 306 (c) (1) (B) (ii); Treas. Reg. 1.306-3(d) (1955).
20CODE § 306(c) (2). See also Rev. Rul. 59-84, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 71.
21 Rev. Rul. 57-132, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 115.
22 See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. de-
nied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954) (decided under the 1939 Code). The utilization of bail-
outs is now restricted substantially by the "booe' provisions in sections 354 and 356 of
the 1954 Code.
23 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
24 E.g., Berner v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Davis v. Penfield,
205 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953) (examples of nonfamily, less marketable situations);
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stock can be exchanged tax free for bonds, but an advance Internal
Revenue Service ruling should ordinarily ,be sought to assure non-
recognition of gain.
C. Collateral Considerations
In order to qualify a recapitalization as a tax-free "E" reorgani-
zation, it is necessary to have a plan of reorganization (although
this need not necessarily be contained in a formal written docu-
ment) and to meet certain reporting requirements.25 Moreover, in
addition to compliance with the mechanical requirements of the
Code and regulations, it 'is necessary that the recapitalization be
motivated by a valid business purpose. " It is clear that this pur-
pose must be more than the avoidance of income taxes,27 and, while
earlier cases required the business purpose to be that of the corpora-
tion, some recent cases have found the business purposes of share-
holders to be sufficient." Some business purposes which have
been judicially approved are the protection of assets from the
claims of creditors," the facilitation of shareholder estate plan-
ning,"0 the reduction of the corporate interest burden, 1 and the re-
distribution of voting rights.3
Unlike some of the other types of reorganizations, continuity
of interest may not be necessary in a recapitalization.38 However,
departing shareholders may be required to recognize their gain in
full under sections 354, 356, and 302.34
D. Effect on the Corporation
A corporation which issues new stock in a recapitalization does
Daisy Seide, 18 T.C. 502 (1952); Wolf Envelope Co., 17 T.C. 471 (1951), nonac-
quiesced in, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 6 (nonpro rata situations which qualified as tax free).
25 C.T. Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1937); James G.
Murrin, 24 T.C. 502, (1955), acquiesced in, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 7; National Pipe &
Foundry Co., 19 B.T.A. 242 (1930), nonacquiesced in, XlI-CUM. BULL 10 (1932).26 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affg, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
The appropriate regulations are Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1 (b), (c) (1955).
27 SeeJ.D. &A.B. Spreckels Co., 41 B.T.A. 370 (1940).
28 See, e.g., Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962);
Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).2 9 Howard Hotel Corp., 39 B.T.A. 1147 (1939), vonacquiesced in, 1939-2 CUM.
BULL. 54.
30 Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
31 Annis Furs, Inc., 2 T.C. 1096 (1943), acquiesced in, 1944 Cum. BULL. 2.
32 Wolf Envelope Co., 17 T.C. 471 (1951).
33 Berner v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 (1960); Alan 0. Hickok, 32 T.C. 80
(1959), vonacquiesced in, 1959-2 Crm. BULL. 8.
34 See Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1 (d) (1960).
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not realize gain on the issuance.85  If a tax benefit has been ob-
tained by the accrual of interest deductions, the Internal Revenue
Service may contend that a corporation which substituted new
bonds for outstanding stock and bonds received cancellation-of-
indebtedness income under section 61(a)(12) unless an election is
made under section 108(a) to reduce the corporation's basis in the
bonds in accordance with section 1017.86 If no gain is recognized
by the shareholders in a recapitalization, the corporation's earnings
and profits are not affected. If the shareholders do have gain
which is treated as a dividend under section 356(a)(2), the corpo-
rate earnings and profits are reduced by the amount of the divi-
dend.37 Since the corporate existence is unaffected by a recapitali-
zation, all tax attributes such as net operating losses, accounting
methods, and bad debt reserves are preserved without the necessity
of complying with section 381.88 Thus, the limitations on net op-
erating loss carryovers provided by section 382 are inapplicable to
recapitalizations despite the possibility of shifts in stock ownership.
For Ohio personal property tax purposes there had been, prior
to 1963, a question whether the distribution of a new class of stock
would constitute taxable "income yield" under Ohio Revised Code
section 5701.10. The Supreme Court of Ohio then held that a
distribution of common stock with respect to existing common
stock was not income yield,89 but that a distribution of preferred
on common was income yield.4 ° The latter result was changed by
legislation in 1963 so that all stock distributions pursuant to a re-
capitalization are now nontaxable for Ohio personal property tax
purposes.4'
II. TYPE "F" REORGANIZATIONS
Section 368(a)(1)(F) provides tax-free reorganization treat-
ment for those corporate changes which result in "a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization, however effected." As
with recapitalizations, the Internal Revenue Code gives no assist-
ance to the practitioner in defining or illustrating the content of
3 5 Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 80.
3 6 See Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 143.
3 7Treas. Reg. § 1.312-11(b) (1955).
38 See Rev. Rul. 54-482, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 148.
39 Weaver v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 1, 179 N.E.2d 50 (1962).
4 0 Way v. Bowers, 175 Ohio St. 331, 194 N.E.2d 772 (1963); Coburn v. Bowers,
173 Ohio St. 4, 179 N.E.2d 50 (1962).
4 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 5701.10 (Page Supp. 1966).
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an "F" reorganization. Moreover, the Treasury Department, in
issuing its regulations completely omitted this type of reorganiza-
tion, which, although at one point almost deleted from the Code,
still has substantial utility in the area of corporate attribute carry-
overs under section 381, and in the Subchapter S and Small Business
Stock areas of sections 1371-78 and 1244.
The scope of the "F" reorganization is still uncertain. In the
last few years it has been the statutory backdrop for considerable
litigation. There have been recent cases in the area of net operat-
ing loss carryovers as well as the so-called "liquidation-reincorpora-
tion" area. Fortunately for taxpayers, the Commissioner has met
with little success in the latter area, mainly because the courts have
narrowly construed the ambit of the "F" reorganization.' In one
case it has been said to encompass "only the simplest and least sig-
nificant of corporate changes,"4 and in another case it was held to
be "limited to cases where the corporate enterprise continues unin-
terrupted, except perhaps for a distribution of some of its liquid
assets" so that "there is a mere change of corporate vehicles, the
transferee being no more than the alter ego of the transferor."44
An "F" reorganization is generally limited to a single corporation45
but it also includes reincorporation in another State by the forma-
tion of a new corporation into which the existing corporation is
merged.46 All corporate assets must be promptly transferred to
the new corporation except those used to satisfy dissenting share-
holdersY
Where a transaction constitutes an "F," as well as constitutes
an "A," "C," or "D" reorganization, the Internal Revenue Service
has ruled that the transaction will be treated as an 'T" reorganiza-
tion for purposes of carryovers.45 Thus, the taxable year of the
predecessor corporation is not terminated as would ordinarily occur
under section 381(b)(1). Moreover, section 381(b)(3), which pro-
42 See cases cited notes 43-44 infra, But cf. Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d
125, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1966) (dictum).
43 Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 752 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966).
44 Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g 42 T.C.
510 (1964).
45 Associated Machine, 48 T.C. 277 (1967); Estate of Bernard F. Stauffer, 48 T.C.
318 (1967).
46 Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 126.
47 Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. deuied, 293
U.S. 611 (1934).
48 Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 Cmi. BULL. 126.
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hibits carrybacks of net operating losses from taxable years after an
"A," "C," or "D" reorganization to earlier years of the acquired
corporation, is inapplicable. 9 The Service has also stated that an
"F" reorganization will not jeopardize the Small Business Stock
status of outstanding section 1244 stock which is replaced,5" nor
will a valid Subchapter S election be terminated where, pursuant
to an "F" reorganization, a corporation merges into a new corpora-
tion formed in a different State if the new corporation meets all
of the Subchapter S requirements.5
In order to obtain a favorable advance revenue ruling, the In-
ternal Revenue Service has stated that there can be no significant
change in stock ownership or proprietary interest, with the excep-
tion to allow dissenting shareholders holding less than 1 percent of
the outstanding shares of the predecessor corporation to refuse to
acquire stock in the successor corporation.52
Procedurally, the question arises as to whether a corporation
which has undergone "F" reorganization needs to alter its reporting
to the Internal Revenue Service. Under the income tax regula-
tions, certain information must be filed with the income tax return
for the taxable year during which a reorganization occurs. Beyond
this reporting requirement, there appears to be no published position
of the Internal Revenue Service as to whether a new employer's
identification number is required, or whether the entity is treated
as a new corporation for purposes of the Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act, Federal Unemployment Tax Act and federal excise
taxes, and for purposes of reporting to State agencies. Since an "F"
reorganization involves only a single corporation and is merely "a
change in identity, form, or place of organization," it would seem
that no new reporting requirements would have to be met. This
conclusion appears to be supported by a recent ruling in the federal
employment tax area."
The following examples of transactions which have been held
to be "F" reorganizations illustrate some of the varieties of this
type of reorganization and the fact that a corporation may some-
49 Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 983 (1957); see Casco Products Corp., 49 T.C. 32 (1967); Associated Ma-
chine, 48 T.C. 277 (1967); Estate of Bernard F. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 318 (1967).
5 0 Treas. Reg. S 1.1244(d)-3(d) (1) (1960).
5 1 Rev. Rul. 64-250, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 333.
5 2 Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
53 Rev. Rul. 68-63, 1968 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6, at 21. Compare id., with S.S.T. 188,
1937-2 Cum. BULL. 377, and Rev. Rul. 62-60, 1962-1 CUm. BULL. 186.
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times undergo an "F" reorganization without realizing it. Obtain-
ing a new corporate charter in the same State or in a different
State" constitutes an "F" reorganization, as does the act of merely
renewing a corporate charter.5 It has been indicated that the con-
version of a federally chartered savings and loan association into a
State-chartered institution constitutes an "F" reorganization. "6 Sim-
ilarly, the conversion of a State-chartered savings and loan associa-
tion into a national bank constitutes an "F" reorganization." The
Internal Revenue Service has recently ruled that there could be an
"F" reorganization where a corporation, desiring to conduct its busi-
ness in trust form, established an association taxable as a corporation
under section 7701 (a) (3), and transferred all of the corporate as-
sets subject to liabilities in exchange for transferable certificates of
beneficial interest which it then distributed to its shareholders in
exchange for their stock. Under these circumstances the trust was
held to qualify as a corporation for purposes of section 368."
Finally, some recent cases illustrate the importance currently
attached to qualification as "F" reorganizations in regard to net
operating losses. Under section 381(b), a net operating loss in-
curred by an acquiring corporation prior to a reorganization cannot
be carried back to a prior taxable year of the acquired corporation,
unless the transaction qualifies as an "F" reorganization. Hence, a
corporation which finds itself with a net operating loss in a year
shortly after a "change" of corporate identity may attempt to bring
itself within the "F" category in order to avail itself of a carryback
of the operating loss to the successful years prior to the "change."
During 1967, the Commissioner prevailed twice in the conten-
tion that the amalgamation of more than one corporation into a
single corporate entity could not qualify as an "F" reorganization,
regardless of the common shareholdings. In Estate of Barnard H.
Stauffer,9 one individual owned all of -the stock in three corpora-
tions which operated weight-reducing businesses in several States.
In order to centralize operations, he decided to combine all opera-
tions within the framework of a New Mexico corporation created
54 See Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 611 (1934); George Whittell & Co., 34 B.T.A. 1070 (1936).
56 Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 983 (1957).
56 Cf. Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
57 1966 private letter ruling.
58 Rev. Rul. 67-376, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 44, at 13.
59 48 T.C. 277 (1967).
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for this purpose. A ruling was obtained from the Revenue Service
that the transaction constituted a valid "A" reorganization. In the
4-month fiscal year following the reorganization, the surviving
New Mexico corporation had a substantial operating loss which it
attempted to offset against the prereorganization income of the
other three corporations in the 8 months prior to the reorganiza-
tion, on the theory that an "F" reorganization had occurred. Even
more substantial losses were incurred by the new entity in the next
full fiscal year and it attempted to carry these back against the pre-
reorganization income of the three operating corporations on the
same theory. The Commissioner took the position that the com-
bination of two or more corporations each of which had conducted
a separate business could not qualify as an "F" reorganization be-
cause more than a single corporation was involved. The merger
of three viable corporations into a single new corporate entity in-
volved changes that were too far reaching for the transaction to be
dismissed as a "mere change in identity, form, or place of organiza-
tion." Judge Raum, in a Court Reviewed opinion with no dissents,
found for the Commissioner. The court stated that the corporation
had not merely moved to New Mexico but in addition many cor-
porate changes had occurred. The fact that Mr. Stauffer was at
al'l times the sole shareholder and the fact that the assets were un-
changed could not minimize the extent of the transaction. The
separateness of the corporate entities was recognized but the tax-
payer's attempt to expand the coverage of "F" reorganizations was
rejected. The Tax Court in the Stauffer case expressly renounced
its 1964 decision in Pridemark, Inc.6" (which had been reversed in
part by the Fourth Circuit)6 and rejected an alternative holding
of the Fifth Circuit in Davant v. Commissioner," both of which
had given far broader scope to "F" reorganizations.
The day after the Stauffer decision, Judge Harron decided As-
sociated Machine,63 which involved two corporations that had com-
bined. Although the transaction itself was a tax-free "A" reorgani-
zation, the decision resulted in a substantial tax detriment to the
taxpayer. Net operating loss carrybacks were denied for the years
after the merger because the court found that more than a "mere'
change of form had occurred.
6042 T.C. 510 (1964).
6 1 Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
62 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
6348 T.C. 318 (1967).
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As in the liquidation-reincorporation cases, it sometimes suits
the Commissioner's purposes to argue for the recognition of an "F"
reorganization. In Dunlap & Associates, Inc." he used this ap-
proach by fragmenting a series of transactions into one "F' and
two "B" reorganizations rather than a single integrated reorganiza-
tion. Had a single plan been found, the dosing of a taxable year
would have occurred. "  Because an "F" reorganization was found,
the taxable year of the transferred corporation did not close, and an
additional surtax exemption was denied. This case illustrates that
especially in the reorganization area, even under the apparently
simple language of "F' reorganizations, the ingenuity and power
of the Commissioner to recast transactions should not be under-
estimated.
The Commissioner has not won all of the 1967 cases dealing
with "F" reorganizations. In Holliman v. United States,6 a dis-
trict court in Alabama found an "F" reorganization where all of
the old corporation's assets were acquired in a bulk sale and a new
corporation was formed in order to settle creditors' claims. The
new corporation continued to operate the business. Relying on
the Fifth Circuit's statement in Davant v. Commissioner," which
the Tax Court had rejected in Stauffer, the District Court called
the transaction merely a change of vehicle rather than of substance
and pointed out that the shareholders, assets, and nature of the busi-
ness operations had remained unchanged. Thus the taxpayer, who
was the trustee in bankruptcy of the shareholders, was permitted
to offset net operating losses which occurred subsequent to the ar-
rangement with creditors, against profits prior to that time. All
that had occurred, said the court, was a change of name and a scal-
ing down of debts, which were acts no broader in scope than the
mere changes permitted by the statute.
Finally, the taxpayer in Casco Products Corp.68 persuaded a
majority of the Tax Court that a series of complex corporate ma-
neuvers designed to eliminate minority stockholders constituted a
redemption (albeit in reorganization clothing) which fell outside of
section 368. In that case Standard Kollsman Industries, Inc. ac-
quired 91 percent of Casco Products Corporation by a public tender
6447 T.C. 542 (1967).
65 CODE § 381(a) (2) (B).
60 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9737 (D.C. Ala. 1967).
67 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1965).
(849 T.C. 32 (1967).
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offer in 1960 and early 1961. In order to eliminate dissidents
among the remaining 9 percent shareholders, a new Connecticut
corporation, SKO, Inc., was formed as a wholly owned subsidiary
of Standard Kollsman. A merger was then consummated whereby
Casco was merged into SKO, Inc. Under the terms of the merger
agreement the minority shareholders received only cash for their
Casco stock and were thereby eliminated as shareholders. SKO,
Inc. then changed its corporate name to Casco Products Corporation
and continued the business of the former Casco entity in exactly
the same manner, with the same customers, employees, and so
forth. No tax problem would have arisen had the new Casco en-
tity not suffered a net operating loss of approximately $1,500,000
for calendar year 1961. Had there been no merger, the old Casco
corporation clearly could have used this loss to obtain a refund of
its taxes paid during the prior 3 taxable years under section 172
by applying the net operating losses against the income it had
earned in those years. Because of the merger, however, it became
imperative for the taxpayer to prove that either an "F" reorganiza-
tion had taken place or that there had in substance been no reor-
ganization, so that the net operating loss of the new entity could
be carried back against the profits of the old entity. The Revenue
Service argued that there had 'been a statutory merger ("A" reor-
ganization) but not an "F" reorganization, because there had been
a 9 percent shift in proprietary interest, which, under the Service's
position" would be more than the permissible 1 percent and thus
more than a "mere" change in identity had taken place. Speaking
for the majority, Judge Tannenwald "declined the invitation" of
both parties to determine whether an "F" reorganization had taken
place. Viewing the entire set of transactions as a "squeezeout"
technique utilized in lieu of a redemption, and, stating that "[tax-
wise, New Casco was merely a meaningless detour along the high-
way of redemption of the minority interests in Old Casco," the ma-
jority held that "the merger was a reorganization in form only and
should consequently be ignored as such. What took place was a
redemption of nine percent of the Old Casco shares and no more.""0
The loss carryback was therefore permitted. Five judges dissented
stating that the old and new corporations were separate viable en-
69 Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 115.
70 This raises at least two interesting questions: the ability of a taxpayer to argue
that the "substance" of a transaction should take precedence over the form in which he
himself has cast it; and secondly, when should one section of the Code have priority
over another, assuming both are applicable to the same transaction.
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tides with more than transitory lives. Recognizing that the ques-
tion of whether the transaction constituted an "F" reorganization
was a "teasing and difficult one," they believed that it should never-
theless have been decided.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Casco reflect the
difficulty of determining the scope of "F" reorganizations. Until
there is further litigation it will be difficult to know whether this
section has substantial scope. Nevertheless tax practitioners should
be aware of its possibilities as well as its pitfalls.
